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in each phase of mobilization and contestation.5 They see social interactions and relations as core aspects of social life, institutionally and environmentally structured and mediated through individual perceptions, self-categorizations, interests, and strategic calculations.6 Within this nexus, variation in identity categories is an important link in the causal chain. On the one hand, changes in the meaning of identity categories may be key variables in the explanation of change in political and social behavior.7 In ethnic interface situations, for example, subtle shifts of meaning may make a difference in who is included or excluded, killed or let live, and whether peace or conflict prevails.8 On the other hand, change in identity categories is itself provoked by and responsive to changes in institutional structure and social practice.
The causal links between category change and interactional and institutional change are often complex, with time lags. There may be gradual disruptions of cognitive categories over time, underlying concepts that are put in question, inchoate cultural unease, and new practices that allow old concepts to fade into irrelevance, and these subtle changes provide the underlying conditions in which new categories suddenly become fore-grounded in practice, new self-definitions are crystallized and major institutional change occurs. Gradual changes in the "cultural substratum" then become threshold conditions for sudden radical category change and social transformation. In other cases, identity categories have their own inertia: imposed socio-political changes with correlative changes in social practices and incentive structures fail -at least at first -to impinge on collective categories of identity. This has been the case with European integration and with many peace settlements in situations of ethnic conflict.9 Short of identity change, these institutional changes remain less than transformatory; in some cases, older conflicts are simply transposed within the new structures.1o The key political question in such cases is whether and when identity change will follow and how it may be promoted.
Identity change is, however, complex to recognize and explain. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly treat identity shift, in its subjective, meaningful dimension, in very broad strokes." They are concerned with shifts in macro-categories, rather than with more subtle shifts in modes of identification, categorical content, and relations among categories.12 Yet the changes in contemporary national identity posited in the theoretical literature, to take one example, involve not just change in the bare category of nationality, but in the mode in which it is held and To identify subtle changes in collective identity categories requires attention to the cultural meanings of these categories as well as to behavior and boundaries, and analysis of how these meanings are constituted and changed in different micro-contexts, as well as at the macro level.16 Bringing meaning and variation back in makes explanation considerably more complex. I argue in this article that it is possible, at least when we focus on a few politically crucial meanings of identity categories (in this article, on the interrelations of oppositional meanings and substantive values within the same national identity categories). It is also worthwhile: it allows us to discover patterns in the ways in which collective categories are used and reshuffled in times of social change, the instability of some meaning-configurations and their evolution into others, and dissonances between seemingly authoritative official meanings and on-the-ground popular meanings: in short it allows more subtle typologies and robust explanations of change in collective identity categories. It is also of political importance to recognize patterns of identity change and the conditions that favor or disfavor particular directions of change while change is ongoing, before an old stability of categorical opposition evolves into a new stability of categorical opposition. Just such a period of categorical flux is discussed in the final section of this article.
In the next section, I argue that the work of Pierre Bourdieu, which incorporates social interaction, institutional structure, and subjective meaning, can usefully be developed to deal with identity categories and identity change. On the basis of this discussion, I outline a typology of logically possible responses, at the level of identity, to socio-political change. This is intended at once to allow the explanation of patterns of change in terms of wider social processes and resource distribution, while remaining open to the sense and complexity of experience, and the moments of choice (and the constraints on choice) that arise in social transformations. I then show how these responses are exemplified in one contemporary case of politicallyengineered change -Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement. Most of the examples in this article are about changes in national categorizations, although the argument is intended as a more general one.
Collective categories and the formation of identity

Collective categories of identity
As has been shown in a number of important recent articles, a range of contemporary scholarship has converged in highlighting personal variability and new combinations of meanings in identity categories and moments of choice or intentionality in identity formation, as exemplified in individual life stories.1 This "soft constructivist" analysis decisively breaks with the notion of identity-categories as fixed and defined, as concepts into which individuals fit. Just as there is no longer any hegemonic cultural order, so there are no longer any hegemonically defined identity-categories, national or otherwise." It emphasizes the fluctuating, relational, and situational quality of selfdefinitions that are constructed in social practice and interaction, not in depth psychology. 19 Brubaker and Cooper show, however, that this approach can easily become conceptually incoherent.20 Identity becomes plural, identities proliferate, varying in each situation where a new aspect of self is performed. "Identity-language" classically referred to the stability of the self through a succession of roles; once "identity" is unmoored from such individual stability, it loses its raison d'&tre. It also loses its usefulness for the analysis of social transformations. If we think of identity in terms of multiple, free-floating macro-categories that individuals may choose to emphasize or ignore, depending on charismatic orators, calculations of strategic self-interest, the needs of particular situations, their degree of suggestibility at any point in time, identity change loses any claim to be a significant part of the causal patterning of social change. It becomes no more than interactional change, epiphenomenal.21
If, however, we take seriously the view that collective categories of identity play a significant causal role in framing action, and if we posit a slowly changing "cultural sub-stratum" that may underlie more radical category change, we need a different model of how identity-categories function. We need to recognize not just the complex and varying meanings of these categories and their lack of fixed or foundational status, but also their social "embeddedness" and their personal "anchorage," which allow change or stasis to occur out of phase with other variables, and to affect them in turn. Pierre Bourdieu's work provides just such a model.22 In what follows, I outline the importance of his perspective for the task set out in this article, and then show that it must be adapted to cope with social transformation (rather than the social reproduction that he analyzed), to allow for the "moment of intentionality" and to analyze identity formation and change (rather than the broader concept of the habitus). This falls well short of a theory of identity change, but it allows the identification of conditions that are likely to provoke change in particular identity categories, the development of a typology of ways that this change may proceed and of hypotheses about the conditions that make it likely that it proceeds in one direction rather than another.23
Habitus, social practice, and identity Pierre Bourdieu has shown how the social patterning of individual subjectivity and categorization takes place. He has given a powerful theory of social reproduction whereby individuals internalize the distinctions and values that structure the social world, and then, acting spontaneously in the light of these distinctions, reproduce the social structure whose meanings they have internalized.24 He has analyzed how the habitus -dispositions that give bodily form to collective categories and distinctions -is formed from earliest childhood, as the child situates itself in structured, gendered and differentially "pathed" social space, and internalizes its objective life-chances in its own subjective expectations and interests.25 Such processes produce a set of cumulative, superimposed meanings, dispositions, and modes of perception embodied in the individual. Some of these may be laid down in infancy but they are social products, even if they sometimes appear to individuals as "primordial" givens.26
Social practice is at the core of his analysis; it is where individuals at once encounter and internalize distinction, and where, even in new situations, the habitus reproduces socially structured distinction and ensures historical continuity as if spontaneously.27 Through this process, collective categories are interrelated in understanding and habitus just as they are institutionally. The precise set of interrelated categories from any particular standpoint in any particular society gives the subjective possibility of shared experience. This is differentiated in national, class, gender, regional, and local terms, so that "being English" differs from different class standpoints, and also from different gender, regional and local perspectives, just as class belonging takes specific national, ethnic, gender, regional and local forms.28 These are not, on Bourdieu's view, multiple "identities" that one wears and changes, but rather the overlapping categories merge into particular and distinctive forms of habitus.29
Bourdieu moves decisively beyond many of the dichotomies that characterize contemporary writing on identity. Individual and social identity, instrumental and affective modes of identification are intrinsically interrelated in his writing.30 Collective categories are embodied in the individual habitus and expressed not simply in collective action but also in the subtler signs of individual distinction, down to the choice of jewelry, make-up, and clothing.31 This reproduces collective distinction at the micro-level, ensuring that spontaneous attraction and friendship, marriage and family relations tend to fall within collective categories. All such embodied collective categories bring with them a felt immediacy. All give the potential for immediate contact with others whom we recognize as "like ourselves," and a related sense of belonging with those who share our categories and who recognize and respond positively to our immediate intuitive distinctions. But while, in practice, the embodied categories carry this emotional charge, analytically the formation of shared experiences and the "warm" sense of group belonging and solidarity may be explained coolly, in terms of core social variables.
Bourdieu's theory, in these respects, provides an invaluable startingpoint for analysis of identity. It has, however, been criticized for its failure to explain change and to account for variation.32 Whether these criticisms are accurate for Bourdieu's work as a whole is a question beyond the scope of this article.33 They do, however, show that the preliminary schema presented above requires refinement. That schema appears to explain social reproduction and social evolution but not radical social change.34 It appears that such change can only come from outside intervention or the impingement of wider processes, since internal feedback patterns ensure the reproduction of both the habitus and the social order. Radical cultural change can, it seems, only be the delayed result of such imposed social change.35 However, if this is the only source of cultural or categorical change, it may be signally ineffective, since new elements may be "indigenized" by social practices determined by older distinctions. This practice, well theorized by Bourdieu, is a common phenomenon in deeply divided societies where actors are able to incorporate new resources brought by potentially radical social transformations such as industrialization or democratization or European integration within the divided social structure.36
Part of the problem lies in the positing of a single dominant social and symbolic order. In complex modern societies, there may be several competing symbolic orders coexisting in tension within specific institutions or "fields," not just one authoritative system.37 Studies of the state show, for example, different sets of policy orientations and different key conceptual oppositions embedded in different state institutions and sometimes competing within them.38 Class distinction too may be experienced and produced in different ways: Lamont's studies show that bourgeois individuals may choose to define themselves in terms of ethical rather than cultural or material distinction and this choice does not appear to follow the particular bourgeois "fraction" to which the individuals belong.39 More radically again, there are some societies where one finds not just contested variants of one symbolic order but at least two different symbolic orders within deeply contested social institutions. This is most evident when one moves from class to ethno-national or religious divisions. In situations where two groups with their already formed symbolic systems are brought into conflict, the distinct cultural substance associated with each is not lost, even when one group gains decisive socio-political control. The symbolic orders tend to become formally homologousprecisely because the dominated order must answer and oppose each aspect of the dominant -yet they retain distinct cultural substance. 40 It follows that what the child, or adult, internalizes from social practice may be alternate rather than official meanings, recessive aspects of the social order, implicit contradictions between one set of practices and another. What is embodied in the habitus is a transposition of (and in some circumstances an alternative to) the distinctions of the "dominant social order," and it may come more or less into tension with it.
There is also a tendency to narrow the "grammar" of the habitus to a set of binary oppositions based on power relations. Bourdieu's explanation of social reproduction centers on the role of structured social practice as the mechanism by which objective life-chances are transposed into the habitus. More than binary oppositions are thus constituted as dispositions. Complex social practices typically involve at once relations with others (which can build cooperative capacity, skills and virtues) and relations against others (which mark one off from those outside).41 The point is clear in Bourdieu's own empirical studies of crafted interactional patterns or the forming of aesthetic taste.42 Yet the real values, and sometimes also virtues, associated with these practices are subsumed within class distinction, and not prioritized in his analysis.43 Thus one of the internal tensions within the individual habitus -and another potential source of change -is elided. For example, ethno-national distinction is built both from participation-with-others in institutions and social practices, and by exclusion-of-others from these institutions and practices: at once from the multitude of everyday practices and norms that make up "banal nationalism" and from an institutionally credited ranking of these practices that defines the value of cultural capital and constitutes a set of power resources for some and against others.44 National identity at once involves positive values, which grow out of participation and mutual dependence, and implicit oppositions with lesser nations.45 Similarly, in deeply divided societies, ethnic categories are mutually opposed, yet they also resonate with values derived from specific traditions and practices.46 Ethnic and national conflict is all the more intense because the actors know that what is at stake is not empty categories or mere power, but also real values rooted in specific traditions. When we move from consideration of the national category of identity to the interrelations of nationality, class, gender, familial, career, and other categories, the possibility of internal tension within the habitus increases. While, in principle, one is not gendered separately from being national or from being a member of a given class, the contents and values associated with each category take different prominence in different fields and may co-exist in considerable tension.
A third general point arises from the fact that Bourdieu's work centered on the habitus, that totality of dispositions produced without conscious intent. Identity, however, is not the habitus: there is too much in the habitus, much of it below the level of consciousness, much irrelevant to how one conceives of oneself.47 The habitus rather gives a substratum from which identity is formed in a process of arrangement and rearrangement of some of these elements of embodied meaning and value, with some held close to the center of self, others left on the margins.48 Identity-narratives are the reports of (sometimes the performance of) the arrangement and rearrangement of these blocks of meaning.49 Identity formation and change is thus a continuous process that involves a considerable degree of intentionality. It takes place by the incorporation of new elements of embodied meaning and value, or the rearrangement of old. New elements may be created, not ex nihilo but by the choice to foreground particular practices and relations rather than others, so that over time the meanings embedded in these practices become an integral part of the self, while others fade. Such choices are not costless: after years of work and sacrifice, one may find that a sense of belonging in one's adopted society still eludes one; similarly, old meanings may be marginalized but never totally fade. By the same sort of process, this time combining social practices in new ways, new combinations of meanings can come into being. Again, choice is typically constrained, on the one hand by socially entrenched symbolic codes and multiple social pressures not to break them, and on the other hand by personal history that may have laid down some dispositions so early in infancy that they are changeable, if at all, only by depth analysis. Complex patterns of identity change may result. When, for example, peripheral nationalist parties in Catalonia or Scotland or Northern Ireland at once oppose the central state and seek involvement in European networks and global linkages, they begin to constitute a hard-edge anti-statist but non-exclusivist, hybrid national identity. If, however, access to European and global networks is restricted until anti-statism is softened, this tends to create a different sort ofnational-identity configuration and one that may not meet voter expectations, thus opening the way to future shifts in voter support (from CiU to ERC in Catalonia, from SDLP to Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland).
These points allow us to identify three mechanisms of change in collective categories of identity: dissonances between the social order and the individual habitus; dissonances within the individual habitus; and the moment of intentionality in identity formation. They also allow a more subtle and differentiated analysis of collective identity categories. First, the discussion shows that meaning of collective identity categories is complex, composed of a plurality of elements coexisting in tension. These elements include binary oppositions, substantive values and virtues and normative principles, cognitive assumptions, and understood relations with other categories.5o Each is derived from meanings embedded in the social structure. A mapping of these elements, and of their typical combinations, can be achieved by focused research.51
Second, there are diverse ways of constructing identity categories. The elements may be intertwined in different permutations and combinations with varying degrees of tension. The meanings of these categories cannot therefore be read off from dominant political discourses: there may be numerous ways to "be Irish" or to "be Basque," quite different from "official" views, pursued spontaneously by different groups and sub-sets of groups and individuals, combining differently regional, local, gender, age, class, religious, and cultural stances. These may not adequately be represented by politicized contest in the public sphere, yet they are in no sense "private languages" of purely personal significance; each variant may be recognizable within the culture and appeal to particular historical traditions within it.52 Arguably this divergence of popular and "official" categorical identification, and variation and flux at the popular level, is a phenomenon of the contemporary age, experienced by many individuals reassessing their options in societies experiencing economic restructuring, Europeanization, globalization, and new phases of immigration.53 Third, there is a "moment" of intentionality in the making and remaking of identity categories, a choice of which permutations and combinations of elements to accept. This choice is, however, highly qualified. Its exercise may require a high level of cultural and social resources. For example, to distinguish oppositional aspects of national categories from the cultural substance of these categories when both are conflated in one's identity requires considerable cultural resources and intellectual stamina, while to separate the meanings in public interactions may require unusual courage. To engage in new social practices that allow a recombination of meanings requires institutional and social opportunities. Change may be achieved only at high personal cost: as elements of meaning are centered or de-centered, the interpretation of key episodes in the past in which these meanings came into play may also be changed, and the sense of self may be affected.54 Cultural and social resources, not least in the form of public acknowledgment of the costs of widespread change and public recognition of multiple perspectives on the past, can aid such processes of change.55 The form and distribution of key social and cultural resources, therefore, are among the determinants of the likely directions of change in identity categories.
Fourth, change in collective identity categories is on-going. Individuals and sets of individuals often find their intuitive categorizations out of phase with those of their class or group, and still more so with official, state-centered categorizations, or they find that the elements of their own categorizations come into internal tension. Unease, personal discontent, and revision of category structures proceeds, sometimes independent of, sometimes cohering with, sometimes appealing to new modes of identity-construction put forward by political or communal entrepreneurs.56 More radical, society-wide identity change is provoked when socio-political changes bring the elements of collective identity categories into evident contradiction for whole populations. Then individuals are forced to re-sort the elements of their identity. Which directions are chosen depend in part on the prior processes of gradual identity reconstruction within the population, in part on available new resources. When whole populations face such choices, the directions chosen have major political effects.
Social-political change and identity change Modes of identity transformation
A key cause of change in categories of collective identity is social change. In a society structured throughout by a key set of power relations, radical change in these relations will also cast in doubt the oppositional elements of the collective identity category and their interrelations with other elements. Where, for example, economic position has been correlated with racial or ethnic or gender categories, effective fair employment practices change the "entry tickets" to economic positions and with them the socially sanctioned interrelation With the official recognition of the value of minority or dominated cultures, the socially sanctioned association of particular cultural categories with norms of progress, civility, or rationality is "decertified."57 With new actors in positions of power, the networks of informal influence change, and with them socially sanctioned expectations of having, or not having, an authoritative voice in society. Where identity has been entwined with power, these changes are experienced not simply as a change of regime, but -for the dominant group -as an overturning of the moral order, an insult to their own integrity and identity, a placing of the undeserving above the deserving. It is a particularly sharp form of dissonance, where the world is not ordered as they had come to expect, and where these expectations were constitutive of their sense of themselves. Those who have long opposed the dominant order may also find that change disrupts the categories in terms of which they had defined themselves. Others, already uneasy with the dominant categorical oppositions, will welcome the opportunity to move beyond them.
If identity shift is predictable in these circumstances, the form, direction and phasing of that shift is likely to vary depending on the resources available for identity change. Table 1 , above, distinguishes responses in terms of the extent of change and the way in which it is expressed in practice. Even those responses that begin by refusing identity change tend to introduce new elements and tensions into identitycontent.
Reaffirmation
This option reaffirms the existing core binary oppositions and welcomes or resists change in their name. For those who have benefited, the elements within the identity-category may be reaffirmed because they sense that they are winning, they are "on a roll," ready to seize the chance to give public prominence to their values, ideas, and concepts at the expense of their former superiors. Those who were once dominant, in contrast, reaffirm their categories in the very process of resisting change. In some cases, where those who resist set up their own networks and social mechanisms of mutual support (as did the French resistance in WWII), the resistance option may be self-confirming. In other cases, resistance introduces new elements into the identity structure: the experience of marginalization, the practice of conservation, and the threat of extinction produce quite different cognitive assumptions, meanings, and values than did the previous experience of successful, expansive social interaction." Sometimes, too, key elements of the old identity-categories may be eroded -respect for authority, the belief in progress, the sense of order, and the expectation of influence are unlikely to survive social marginalization and sustained opposition. In these cases, while the oppositional aspect of the collective identity category is retained, its evaluative content, core assumptions, and relations with other categories change, sometimes to the extent that the identity-structure collapses and reaffirmation turns to conversion.
Conversion
For those who were once-dominated and who constructed their identity against the dominant order, as for those who were once-dominant, structural change may render irrelevant older categorical oppositions. As the linkages between the elements of the identity-category collapse, and as many of the old elements are sensed as absurd in the new situation, the symbolic grammar embedded in the new order may simply be accepted as a package, in a form of conversion. Of course, converts must also find within themselves the capacity to work within the new categories, or else they will be liable to disillusion and further change. The stability of conversion depends on how far the substratum of individual dispositions may be reordered within the new structure. In some dramatic and seemingly sudden cases of category change, for example with whites during the South African transition, the conditions for change had long been prepared in the increasing lack of fit of categories to practice, in inchoate unease as self-perceptions did not meet the perceptions of others, in the strain of holding to an ideology that no longer met either interests or experience. Only when we look beyond the self-reported national categories, can the extent of identity change be recognized. It has, for the most part, taken place in the content of each category rather than involving change between categories. The typology set out in Table One allows 
